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1Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining
Parental Rights of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite
Varying Recognition of their Relationship
LINDA S. ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a child growing up with two committed, loving parents.  The
child knows that each parent has a unique role in the family relationship,
and the interactions between the three are different, yet comfortable for all
involved.  The child understands that one parent stays at home to care for
the child while the other parent spends time at work to provide for the
family.  Each parent finds a way to spend special time with the child, and
they all work hard to spend special time together.
The child in this scenario understands that she can rely on either of her
parents to protect her, to provide for her, to make important decisions for
her, and to advocate for her.  In line with this understanding, the child’s
parents each take on these responsibilities.  This is, after all, what they
expected when they decided to have children.
Now imagine the family relocating because of a change in employment
circumstances.  This relocation involves moving to a neighboring state.
The family adjusts to the move easily, and the roles and expectations do
not change.  Yet, as a result of the move, the child no longer has two par-
ents.  She now has only one parent.  Only one of the adults she has known
as her parents is allowed to make decisions on her behalf.  Only one of her
parents is allowed to register her for school, access her immunization re-
cords, and provide health insurance for her.  In addition, should one of her
parents die, she will be the beneficiary of that parent’s estate, but if the
other dies she will get no benefits at all.  And, should her parents ever de-
cide to end their relationship, the state court will require one of her parents
to continue supporting her but may not require this of the other and will not
necessarily ensure that she be allowed to maintain a relationship with one
of her parents.
This is the situation facing many children today.  As children born of
same-sex parents in states that recognize same-sex relationships and grant
them the same rights and responsibilities as those in heterosexual mar-
 * Visiting Professor of Legal Skills, Stetson University College of Law.
2 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 1   
riages (regardless of what they name the relationship), these children can
have their entire life turned upside down by simply crossing a state border.
No court is involved, no action is initiated by either of the parents, and no
state agency is involved.  The only difference is which state law applies to
the relationship between the parents, and consequently, the relationship
between each parent and the child.
What causes this life-altering change?  In the growing number of states
that grant all the rights of marriage to those in same-sex relationships,1
whether they call them marriages,2 civil unions,3 or domestic partnerships,4
the presumption of parentage found in the respective parentage statutes or
case law addressing children of same-sex couples can cause both partners
to be recognized as parents of a child born to one of them during the mar-
riage or civil union.5  Yet, once the family moves to a state that does not
recognize the same-sex relationship, the rights and obligations of parent-
hood may cease to exist for the non-biological parent because these rights
and obligations are the result of a sister state’s recognition of the same-sex
relationship.6
For example, in the summer and fall of 2004, the reality of the conse-
quences of a few states choosing to recognize same-sex relationships and
other states refusing to do so became painfully apparent in a case involving
 1. Currently California, Connecticut, Vermont and Massachusetts grant rights equivalent to those
of marriage to same-sex couples.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004) (granting domestic partners
the same rights as spouses); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38oo (West Supp. 2006) (granting rights of
marriage to those who enter into civil unions in Connecticut); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002)
(granting all rights of marriage to members of civil unions); see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (establishing right to same-sex marriage in Massachusetts).
 2. In Massachusetts, same-sex couples may be married.  See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
 3. In Connecticut and Vermont, same-sex couples may enter civil unions.  See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-38bb; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202.
 4. California recognizes same-sex domestic partnerships.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.
 5. Though not tested in each state that recognizes same-sex couples, those that have addressed this
issue have found the children have two parents, both of the same sex.  See Elisa B. v. Superior Court,
117 P.3d 660, 668 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing a woman’s right to the presumption of parentage to a child
born to her same-sex partner); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶¶ 48, 56, 59 (2006)
(recognizing both women in a civil union as parents of a child born to one of the women);  see also VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (specifying that members of civil unions have the same rights regarding
children born to one during the union as those of married couples).  Case law or statutory provisions in
other states are available for similar application.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 6 (1998) (granting
presumption of paternity to man married to the mother); Freda v. Freda, 476 A.2d 153, 155 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984) (acknowledging that children born during marriage are presumed to be legitimate).
 6. The majority of states that do not allow legal recognition of same-sex relationships also legislate
against recognition of rights based on other states’ recognition of this relationship.  E.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West 2001) (“A marriage between persons of the same gender performed in another
state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state as of the date of the marriage.”).  These
provisions are often referred to as mini-DOMAs, because of their similarity to the federal Defense of
Marriage Act, also known as DOMA.
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Janet and Lisa Miller-Jenkins.7  Partners in a civil union legalized in Ver-
mont on December 19, 2000,8 Janet and Lisa turned to two separate state
courts to determine rights and custody of the child they had raised as part
of their family.  Once the relationship terminated, the courts attempted to
determine custody and visitation.
The Miller-Jenkins case, as yet to be completely resolved,9 provides a
vivid picture of the challenges facing same-sex couples, but it does not yet
address the underlying problems that will be faced by the growing numbers
of families involving children born to members of a legally sanctioned
same-sex relationship.  Miller-Jenkins helps identify the potential issues,
but differs from other situations that will ultimately arise, because the child
born to this couple was conceived and born in Virginia, a state that specifi-
cally rejects same-sex marriage or civil unions.  This case touches on sev-
eral issues that could arise in same-sex relationships, but, because it is pri-
marily a custody dispute, may not provide answers to questions that will
ultimately arise with intact families.
The difficulty with this situation is the fact that each state has the right
to determine whether to recognize same-sex relationships as the legal
equivalent of marriage or whether to refuse to recognize these relation-
ships.  In fact, the Defense of Marriage Act10 (DOMA) specifically allows
states to not only prevent same-sex partners from obtaining legal recogni-
tion within the state, DOMA also allows states to refuse to acknowledge
these relationships that have already been sanctioned through legal proce-
dures in sister states.11  As a result, children of these relationships are sub-
ject to fluctuating legal relationships based only on geographical location.
This need not be the case.  There is a solution that would allow states
to continue to legalize or prohibit same-sex marriages or civil unions,
while maintaining consistency regarding parental rights and responsibili-
 7. This dispute is actually two separate legal actions.  One seeking dissolution of a civil union and
requesting custody and visitation orders, was filed in Vermont on November 24, 2003.  Miller-Jenkins
v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 (Vt. Fam. Ct. filed Nov. 24, 2003).  After several issues related to
parentage arose, the court, on November 17, 2004, said it would recognize the parental interest of both
parties.  This ruling was appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court which determined that both parties to
the civil union were parents and affirmed the Family Court’s rulings regarding parental rights and
visitation.  Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶ 59.  The second action, seeking a parentage determination,
was filed in Virginia on July 1, 2004.  It was appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals and is awaiting
a decision.  Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, appeal docketed, 2654 04 4 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2004).
 8. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, Nos. 2004-443 & 2005-030 (Vt.
June 7, 2005), available at http://www.glad.org/GLAD_Cases/Miller-JenkinsVTSupremeCtBrief.pdf.
 9. Though the Vermont Supreme Court has affirmed the decisions of the Vermont Family Court, it
is unclear what this ruling will mean for the pending appeal in Virginia.
 10. The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), grants each state the
right to restrict the definition of marriage to members of opposite sexes and to refuse to recognize
same-sex relationships from other states.
 11. Id.
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ties.  Rather than focusing on the relationship of the parents, honing in on
the relationship between the parent and the child, and allowing that rela-
tionship to continue despite the non-recognition of the same-sex relation-
ship is a potential solution.  This can be accomplished by making some
small changes to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA or Act) and the individ-
ual state statutes that are based on this Act.
Vermont was the first state to grant same-sex couples legal recognition
and legal rights and responsibilities.12  Connecticut has followed suit,
granting same-sex partners legal recognition identical to married partners,13
and California has enacted legislation creating domestic partnerships.14
Under the Civil Unions legislation and the Domestic Partnership legisla-
tion, same-sex partners in Vermont, Connecticut, and California are enti-
tled to all the rights and responsibilities granted to heterosexual couples
who marry.15  Statutes that refer to spouses or husband and wife are inter-
preted to include same-sex spouses.  Consequently, under the Vermont
version of the Uniform Parentage Act, a child born to a same-sex couple
could be presumed to be the child of the union, and both parties could be
presumed to be parents.16  Likewise, California and Connecticut authorities
could provide the identical result.17  To date, courts in Vermont and Cali-
fornia have determined parental rights of same-sex partners only in con-
junction with custody disputes.18  Vermont chose not to use the presump-
tion, but instead looked at the parent-child relationship.19  California ap-
plied the parentage presumption.20  Unlike the separate status granted by
Vermont, Connecticut, and California, the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts went one step further than civil unions, granting same-sex partners the
right to marry.21  Though as yet untested, in Massachusetts, married cou-
ples who have a child would both be presumed to be the parents of that
child unless there is a legal action brought to challenge that presumption.22
 12. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002).
 13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to -38pp (West Supp. 2006).
 14. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004).
 15. Id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to -38pp; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204.
 16. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 308(4) (2002).  Though the Vermont Supreme Court acknowledged
that the civil union legislation made this provision applicable to same-sex parents in civil unions, it
declined to base its decision regarding parentage of a child of a civil union on this provision.  See
Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶ 44.
 17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (establishing presumption of paternity for husband of child’s mother);
Schaffer v. Schaffer, 445 A.2d 589, 590 (Conn. 1982) (stating unequivocally that there is a presump-
tion that a man is a child’s father if he is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth).
 18. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
2006 VT 78 ¶ 4 (2006).
 19. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶ 44.
 20. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 668.
 21. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
 22. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 6 (1998).
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By recognizing same-sex relationships as legally equivalent to mar-
riages, these states have also created safeguards for those who choose to
have their relationship recognized.  Once created, a civil union, domestic
partnership, or same-sex marriage cannot be dissolved without the over-
sight of a court.23  This is an important safeguard for the children who are
part of these families, as it ensures that there will be some consideration of
the need to maintain both parents’ support and relationship with the child.
However, unless and until the partners choose to dissolve their union, in
the eyes of the state, the family is treated identically to that resulting from
a heterosexual marriage.  Herein lies the potential problem.
Going one step beyond the Miller-Jenkins situation, where parties are
determining the status of a child born in a state that did not grant the same-
sex partner any rights similar to those of marriage, this article will consider
the issues raised by the fact that under Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecti-
cut, and California state law, same-sex partners who enter civil unions,
domestic partnerships, or marriages are granted all of the rights and obli-
gations of heterosexual married couples.24  Consequently, under state law
in each of these jurisdictions, a child born to a member of the relationship,
after the legal recognition of the relationship through a civil union cere-
mony, registration of a domestic partnership, or marriage ceremony, is a
child of both the birth mother and her spouse.  By granting all the rights of
marriage to same-sex couples, and treating a same-sex partner as a spouse
in any legislation related to the rights and obligations of marriage, Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut create two legally rec-
ognized parents of the child of same-sex partners simply by the birth of
that child.  Like the creation of heterosexual parents, no court action is
necessary.
To illustrate, consider a married heterosexual couple.  When the
woman in this relationship has a child, her husband is presumed to be the
other parent.  Only when there is a dispute about the parentage of the child
will the court become involved, and then, only under certain conditions.
Similarly, in a same-sex relationship recognized by state law, when one
member of the relationship gives birth, the spouse should be presumed to
be the other parent, under the same provision or court decision that allows
 23. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002) (requiring parties to dissolve union through family
court).
 24. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004) (granting domestic partners the same rights as spouses);
CONN.  GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38oo (West Supp. 2006) (granting rights of marriage to those who
enter into civil union in Connecticut); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (granting all rights of marriage to
members of civil unions); see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941 (establishing right to same-sex marriage in
Massachusetts).
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the husband to be the presumed parent of the heterosexual union.25  The
court will only become involved to determine the members of the same-sex
couple’s rights and responsibilities when there is a dispute about parentage.
This arrangement makes sense, as long as the couples remain in the
states that recognize their relationship.  In addition to granting same-sex
couples rights equivalent to marriage, or marriage rights themselves, these
states have also adjusted their systems to address the termination of these
relationships, through divorce proceedings or the equivalent, including
having provisions for establishing parental custody and support for chil-
dren of the relationship.26
The family and parental relationship appears secure as long as the
members of the family stay within the borders of the states that recognize
their relationship.  What happens, though, when the family ventures be-
yond the borders of Vermont, Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut,
has yet to be determined.  Legislation in almost every other state has ad-
dressed whether each state will recognize the couples’ relationship,27 but
no state has determined how it will treat the legal relationship between the
children of these couples and their parents.28  This article will focus on the
fragile legal relationship between same-sex parents and their children and
will suggest legislative adjustments that can address this relationship with-
out forcing states to recognize the underlying relationship with the parents.
Part II will explain the most common methods of addressing parentage
issues in traditional family relationships.  Part III will review the various
methods courts have used to address parentage determinations in same-sex
relationships in states where same-sex relationships are not sanctioned.
Part IV will explain how courts have addressed parentage determinations
 25. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (establishing presumption of paternity for husband of child’s mother);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 6; Schaffer v. Schaffer, 445 A.2d 589, 590 (Conn. 1982) (stating une-
quivocally that there is a presumption that a man is a child’s father if he is married to the mother at the
time of the child’s birth); Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶¶ 48, 56, 59.
 26. Some states rely on language in the legislation creating civil unions of domestic partnerships to
force the alteration of other related statutes.  For instance, California includes a provision in the do-
mestic partnership legislation that states: “(l) Where necessary to implement the rights of registered
domestic partners under this act, gender-specific terms referring to spouses shall be construed to in-
clude domestic partners.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5.  Other states, like Vermont, have identified ex-
actly how dissolutions are to be handled: “The family court shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings
relating to the dissolution of civil unions. The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same proce-
dures and be subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution
of marriage in accordance with chapter 11 of this title, including any residency requirements.”  VT.
STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1206 (2002).
 27. Forty-three states have some form of legislation banning recognition of same-sex relationships.
Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, States With Laws Banning Marriage Between Same-Sex Couples,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/fact.html?record=1427 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
 28. Oklahoma attempted to legislate the ability to ignore out-of-state adoptions by same-sex cou-
ples, but the legislation was recently found unconstitutional.  Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-
1152-C, 2006 WL 1445354 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2006).
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in the states that recognize some form of same-sex relationship.  Part V
will identify potential and actual issues that arise when same-sex couples
travel from states that recognize their relationship to those that do not.
Finally, Part VI will suggest legislative action that can eliminate the need
for varying tests and standards depending on the sexes of the parents.
II. PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS IN HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS
When a heterosexual couple divorces, all states have provisions for
determining custody of children.29  Usually, parentage, meaning who is
considered a legal parent of the child, is not an issue.  In these cases, the
court, in conjunction with granting the couple’s divorce, determines the
parental rights and obligations of each member of the couple.  Questions
about whether one party is actually a parent are resolved under provisions
of state statutes that are often loosely based on the UPA.30
In addition to determining parentage of heterosexual married couples,
the UPA and similar legislation in most states also addresses situations
where parents are unmarried, or where the parents of the child are not mar-
ried to each other but the mother is married to someone else.31
A.  Parentage Determinations Under the UPA
Under the provisions of the UPA, the gestational mother32 is consid-
ered the child’s parent unless a surrogacy agreement is involved.33  If she is
married at the time, the gestational mother’s husband, regardless of
whether there is a biological relationship to the child, is presumed to be the
 29. As of 1981, all fifty states had enacted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act.  Uniform Law Commissioners, Summary: Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-uccjaea.asp (last visited Oct.
31, 2006).
 30. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 295 (2002).  Though only seven states have adopted this act,
nineteen states have adopted the predecessor to this act, the 1973 version of the UPA, and many others
adopted portions of the 1973 version.  Id. at 296 (prefatory comments to the uniform act).  This article
will consider the provisions of the 2002 uniform act rather than evaluating individual state’s enact-
ments.
 31. As stated in the UPA:
 Sections 302-305 clarify that, if a child has a presumed father, that man must file a denial of
paternity in conjunction with another man’s acknowledgment of paternity in order for the
acknowledgement to be valid.  If the presumed father is unwilling to cooperate, or his
whereabouts are unknown, a court proceeding is necessary to resolve the issue of parentage.
 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 313.
 32. Throughout this article mother will be modified by several different terms.  At times, each of
these will refer to the same person; at other times they may not.  Gestational mother refers to the
woman who carries a child and gives birth to the child.
 33. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a), 9B U.L.A. 309.
8 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 1   
father.34  This presumption exists as long as the couple was married at the
time of the birth.35  In addition, the husband is presumed to be the father
even if the couple marries after the child’s birth, as long as the husband
acknowledges the child in compliance with the statute.36  The result of this
presumption can mean the biological or genetic relationship between an
individual and the child is afforded less importance than the legal relation-
ship which results from the couple’s marriage.37
The presumption of parentage is applied differently in each state.  The
way the presumption works can be divided into roughly four categories.
Some states create a strong, but not completely irrefutable presumption.
Others allow the presumption to be rebutted if doing so is in the child’s
best interests.  Still others allow parentage to be rebutted at the time of a
divorce, regardless of whether this is in the child’s best interest and with-
out evaluating the length or quality of the parent-child relationship.  Fi-
nally, a few states allow the presumption to be challenged by anyone who
believes he is a parent, allowing genetic relationships to control the legal
determinations.38
Though now codified in most states, the presumption of legitimacy has
a long history in common law.39  Originating in the common law of Eng-
land to prevent children from losing their inheritance and succession rights,
the presumption was also meant to protect the integrity of families, re-
gardless of the biological connections.40  Addressing parenthood and le-
gitimacy, the United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged that
there can be a difference between biological fatherhood and the determina-
tion that one is a parent.41  Addressing the strong presumption of parentage
included in California’s statutory scheme42 the Court acknowledged the
 34. Id. § 204(a), 9B U.L.A. at 311.
 35. Id. § 204(a)(1), (3), 9B U.L.A. at 311.
 36. Id. § 204(a)(4).  This section sets out specific requirements regarding acknowledgement.
 37. An unrebutted presumption of paternity arising under section 204 results in the establishment of
a parent-child relationship.  Since this presumption arises simply by the birth of a child while the cou-
ple is married, whether the father is the genetic father or not may never be an issue.
 38. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women:  Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 236 (2006).
 39. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion) (exploring the
roots of the presumption to determine whether the relationship between a child and the biological
parent is a protected family unit).
 40. Id. at 125.
 41. Id. at 126-27.
 42. CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (repealed Jan. 1, 1994) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5)
addressed in Michael H. read:
 Child of the marriage; notice of motion for blood tests
 (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.
 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court finds that the conclusions
of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests performed pursuant to
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difference between being a biological father and being a parent, stressing
that parenthood brings “parental prerogatives” with the determination.43
Recognizing that protecting children’s rights and the integrity of families
remained the purpose of the presumption of parentage, the Court asserted
that no state currently awards “substantive parental rights to the natural
father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union
that wishes to embrace the child.”44  Hence, the intent of a gestational
mother’s husband to be the child’s father outweighs the biological relation-
ship over the man who genetically fathers the child.
The priority of the familial unit and the intent of the couple to create a
parent-child relationship over the biological connection are also evident in
the provisions of the UPA addressing children born through assisted repro-
ductive technologies.  Under UPA Articles 7 and 8, like the presumption
that arises upon the birth of a child to a married couple, when couples use
artificial insemination, in-vitro fertilization, gamete donors,45 and gesta-
tional surrogates,46 the parent-child relationship is created with no judicial
intervention.
For instance, a couple who have a child, genetically related to both
members of the couple, yet conceived through artificial reproductive tech-
nology, are still considered parents.  A man, whose wife gives birth to a
child conceived through the fertilization of her ova by an anonymous
sperm donor, is still considered the father, despite the lack of genetic or
biological relationship.  The opposite is also true: a child conceived
through donated egg cells, fertilized by the husband’s sperm, and carried
by the wife is a child of both members of the couple.  Finally, a child ge-
netically related to both, or genetically related to only one, or genetically
related to neither yet carried by a gestational surrogate, is still the child of
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 890) of Division 7 are that the husband is not the fa-
ther of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly.
 (c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the husband
not later than two years from the child's date of birth.
 (d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised by the mother
of the child not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the child's biological fa-
ther has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child.
 (e) The provisions of subdivision (b) shall not apply to any case coming within the provi-
sions of Section 7005 of the Civil Code [dealing with artificial insemination] or to any case
in which the wife, with the consent of the husband, conceived by means of a surgical proce-
dure.
 491 U.S. at 117-18.  The current version of this statute has been renumbered, but the content remains
the same.
 43. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
 44. Id. at 127.
 45. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7, 9B U.L.A. 354 (2002).
 46. Id. art. 8, 9B U.L.A. at 360.
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both the husband and wife.47  In each of these situations, the legal parents
are identified at the time of the child’s birth.
B.  Intent Overrides Biology
In all of the instances described above, the couple’s intent overrides
the genetic or biological relationship.48  Generally, the law presumes an
intact family, even if genetics would contradict this result; the details of
conception are irrelevant.49  With the exception of arrangements involving
gestational surrogates, the UPA attempts to ensure that a child has two
parents, in the same household whenever possible, to provide the most
secure financial and emotional situation possible.  Even in situations in-
volving gestational surrogates where the surrogacy agreement is not valid,
two parents are clearly identified.  The gestational mother is the parent and
her husband, if she is married, is considered the father.50  If she is not mar-
ried, the sperm donor (if known) or the intended father is considered the
child’s father.51
III. PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS WHERE
RELATIONSHIP IS NOT LEGALLY SANCTIONED
As the situation involving Lisa and Janet Miller-Jenkins illustrates,
same-sex couples have children as well.  Though the options necessary to
have children who are genetically related to both members of the couple
are not yet available, same-sex couples use assisted reproductive tech-
niques of several varieties to bring children into their relationship.  How-
ever, legally, for female couples in states that do not grant same-sex cou-
ples rights equivalent to marriage, only one of the members of the couple,
the birth mother, has been considered the parent at the time of the child’s
birth.  While some couples utilize adoption to complete the parent-child
relationship for the additional parent, this is not always a viable option.
 47. Id. §§ 807-809, 9B U.L.A. at 368-69.  Note that not all states that embrace the UPA include
provisions related to surrogacy.
 48. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when genetic consanguinity and
gestation involve two different women, the intent to be a parent determines the natural mother); see
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 (noting that the Court is unaware of any state that awards substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child born into an existing marriage).
 49. The UPA presumptions of parentage allow one to become a parent in many situations where a
biological relationship is missing.  For instance, a husband who marries a woman knowing that she is
already pregnant by another man is presumed to be the child’s parent unless this relationship is chal-
lenged.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(3), 9B U.L.A. at 311.
 50. Id. §§ 201(a)-(b), 807(b), 9B U.L.A. at 309, 368.
 51. Id.
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Some states prohibit adoption unless the birth mother relinquishes her pa-
rental rights; something that many mothers who want to maintain their
relationships to their children are loathe to do.  Male same-sex couples face
even more hurdles, as they must always use a gestational surrogate to give
birth, even if one of the members of the same-sex relationship is geneti-
cally related to the child.  Additionally, some states do not allow same-sex
couples to adopt, regardless of whose genetic material is involved.
With the exception of second-parent adoptions, which may not be
available in many states, parentage determinations for same-sex parents
usually arise in the course of dissolution of the relationship.  In this proc-
ess, same-sex partners may attempt to convince the court that both partners
have acted as parents.  This usually results in the application of equitable
doctrines and a determination that the partner without the legal relationship
to the child is a de facto parent, a psychological parent, or a parent by
estoppel.52  Each of these situations places the parent attempting to estab-
lish a legal relationship in the position of a “legal stranger.”53  In the posi-
tion of a legal stranger, the second parent is unlikely to obtain all the rights
of parenthood.  Usually, if rights are granted, these include custody, visita-
tion, and support, but not the recognition as the legal parent.54  In addition,
these court-determined methods, including step-parent adoption, require
the passage of time and the interference of others to make the determina-
tion.55  Finally, some states are beginning to allow declaratory judgments
establishing partners as parents before the child’s birth,56 but like the post-
birth options, this step requires the interference of the court to determine
parentage.
IV. PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN
STATES THAT GRANT RIGHTS OF MARRIAGE TO SAME-SEX COUPLES
Though Goodridge established the right to marry in Massachusetts,
and legislation created civil unions in Vermont and Connecticut and do-
mestic partnerships in California, whether the provisions of the parentage
statutes in each of these states are part of the rights and responsibilities of
 52. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 560-62 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (granting joint parental rights to
a “psychological parent”).  This case provides a complete and thorough explanation of the different
types of “parents,” all of which have the same characteristics but with different names.
 53. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:  Adjudicating Maternity
for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 351 (2002).
 54. Appleton, supra note 38, at 233-34.
 55. Id.
 56. Steven J. Hyland, The Changing and Uncertain Status of Same-Sex Families, 236 N.J. LAW. 16,
20 (2005).
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marriage that now apply to same-sex couples, or whether these statutes
remain restricted to heterosexual relationships because of the heterosexual
requirement of procreation, has been addressed only in California and
Vermont.  Vermont and California come to different conclusions about
whether the parentage statutes apply to determine that same-sex partners
are both parents, but this is at least partly the result of differing statutory
schemes.57  Regardless, each of these states has found a way to reach the
same result: same-sex partners are both parents of children born during the
relationship.58
Even as Massachusetts was grappling with the implications of
Goodridge, the court recognized that issues regarding parentage would
arise.  One step in the process that resulted in same-sex marriages becom-
ing available in Massachusetts was an attempt by the legislature to create
civil unions, providing all of the benefits and privileges of marriage with-
out being called marriage.59  During this attempt to create civil unions, the
legislature requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts regarding whether civil unions rather than marriage
would meet the equal protection and due process requirements of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution.60  While the majority of the court determined civil
unions would not be constitutional,61 Justice Martha B. Sosman dissented,
identifying potential differences regardless of what the relationship was
called.62  While explaining these differences, Justice Sosman also noted
that certain statutes would need to be overhauled to address same-sex mar-
riages or civil unions.  She provided an example that reaffirms the strength
of the presumption of paternity over the biological relationship.  Noting
that the presumption is gender-based, Justice Sosman wrote:
[I]f a married man impregnates a woman who is not his
wife, the law contains no presumption that overrides the
biological mother’s status and presumes the child to be
that of the biological father’s wife.  By comparison, if a
married woman becomes impregnated by a man who is
not her husband, the presumption makes her husband the
 57. California’s parentage statutes are based on the UPA, while Vermont’s parentage statutes in-
clude only limited provisions of the UPA and include other sections that are not based on the UPA.
 58. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 668 (Cal. 2005); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
2006 VT 78 ¶¶ 48, 56, 59 (2006).
 59. See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
 60. Id. at 566.
 61. Id. at 572.
 62. Id. at 574 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
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legal father of the child, depriving the biological father
of what would otherwise be his parental rights.63
As Justice Sosman points out, applying this interpretation of the availabil-
ity or lack of availability of the presumption literally results in different
outcomes for male same-sex couples than for female same-sex couples.64
Since male same-sex couples must use a surrogate to bear a child, they face
the challenge of overcoming the presumption that their child’s gestational
surrogate mother will be a parent, and her husband, if any, will be the fa-
ther.
In addition, even as Massachusetts was moving forward with same-sex
marriage, the fact that the legal relationships created by marriage would
disappear as same-sex couples crossed state borders did not go unnoticed.65
In light of this, Justice Sosman suggested that a modification of the pre-
sumption of paternity was necessary to address this new situation.66
A.  California Applies Provisions of the UPA
In the aftermath of the recognition of domestic partnerships, California
applied the provisions of its parentage legislation67 to female same-sex
couples, but has not yet addressed same-sex couples involving men.  In
three opinions issued on the same day, the California Supreme Court con-
sidered the parental rights and obligations of a woman to the child of her
lesbian partner when the child was born during the relationship.  Each of
the three cases addressed slightly different situations, all involving parental
rights of women whose lesbian partners gave birth during their relation-
ship.
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, the first case decided by the California Su-
preme Court, addressed a child-support case involving two women who
both gave birth during the course of their relationship.68  Though both
women had raised all three children as their natural children, after the cou-
ple separated, Elisa, the mother who had been providing support for the
family, denied being the parent of the twins who had been born to her for-
mer partner.69  Though the trial court found that Elisa was a parent to all
three children, the Court of Appeals held that Elisa was not a parent under
 63. Id. at 577 n.3 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
 64. Id.
 65. Id. at 575 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
 66. Id.
 67. The California parentage statute, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7605 (West 2004), is based on the
UPA.
 68. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 660 (Cal. 2005).
 69. Id. at 662-63.
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the terms of the California UPA.70  In reaching this decision, the Court of
Appeals relied on Johnson v. Calvert, a prior decision of the California
Supreme Court that stated a child can only have one natural mother.71
Upon reaching its decision in Elisa B., the California Supreme Court clari-
fied its holding in Johnson, stating that the rule that a child can have only
one natural mother was limited to the situation present in Johnson where
there were two potential mothers and a father, creating three potential par-
ents.72  The Elisa B. court moved on to evaluate the situation of two poten-
tial mothers with no others claiming parentage using the section of the
California UPA addressing presumptions of parentage.73  Noting that the
California UPA allows the application of sections of the statute relating to
fatherhood to be used to determine motherhood as well,74 the court con-
cluded that Elisa had received the children into her home and held them
out as her own; had actively participated in causing the children to be con-
ceived with the understanding that she would raise them together with her
partner who had given birth; that she had, in fact, accepted the rights and
obligations of parenthood until the relationship ended; and that there were
no competing claims to her being a second parent.75  Consequently, under
section 7611(d) of the California UPA, Elisa was declared the twins’
mother regardless of the fact that that her partner was also their mother.76
Once the possibility of deciding that a child could have two mothers
was available, the California Supreme Court moved on, in K.M. v. E.G.,77
to address a situation where one partner in a same-sex relationship, K.M.,
donated her egg to the other partner, E.G., for in vitro fertilization.78  At the
time of the donation the parties agreed that K.M., the donor partner, would
not reveal her genetic relationship to the child or others.79  As part of the
egg donation process K.M. also signed a standard agreement acknowledg-
 70. Id. at 664.  The Uniform Parentage Act is codified in California as CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-
7605.
 71. Elisa B., 117 P.3d. at 665; see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 776 (Cal. 1993) (addressing a
dispute between a husband and wife and the surrogate who bore their child, where the genetic mother
and the surrogate mother both claimed to be the child’s mother).  The Johnson court recognized that
each mother demonstrated equally compelling evidence supporting maternity; one based on genetics,
the other on gestation.  Consequently, the court turned to evidence of the couple’s intent to procreate to
determine that the genetic mother who had provided the ovum with the intent to bring a child into the
world and to raise that child as her own was the natural mother.  Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
 72. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.
 73. Id. at 667.
 74. Id.
 75. Id. at 670.
 76. Id.
 77. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
 78. Id. at 675.
 79. Id. at 676.
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ing that she was relinquishing any claim to the resulting child.80  Upon the
birth of the child, both partners welcomed the child into their joint home,
and, though they kept the genetic relationship hidden, both partners were
identified as the child’s mother to family, schools, and others with whom
they interacted.81
Although the court could have applied a provision of the California
UPA providing that a sperm donor is not a father if he provides semen to
someone other than his wife,82 the court chose not to apply this section to
the egg donation from K.M to E.G., despite the fact that K.M. had donated
her eggs to someone who was not her spouse.83  Instead, recognizing that it
had just determined in Elisa B. that the provisions of the UPA that apply to
fathers can also be applied to mothers, the court stressed that this language
included the limitation of “where practicable,” and chose to apply the pro-
vision of the UPA that allows genetic consanguinity to determine paternity
to this situation, though in this case using genetic consanguinity to deter-
mine maternity.84  In so doing, the K.M. court found the fact that K.M. and
E.G. intended to raise the child in their joint home analogous to the situa-
tion in Johnson v. Calvert,85 where the married couple had not intended to
donate their gametes to the surrogate who carried the child they intended to
raise as their own, eliminating any claim by the surrogate to parenthood
based on giving birth.86  As a result, the court carved out an exception for
lesbian mothers, holding that the “exception to the usual rules governing
parentage that appl[y] when a man donates semen to inseminate a woman
not his wife, [do] not apply” when a woman provides ova to her lesbian
partner “in order to produce children who would be raised in their joint
home.”87  Since the donor exception was not applicable, the “usual provi-
sions of the UPA” were used to determine parentage and K.M. was de-
clared a parent based on genetic consanguinity.88
Unlike the unanimous decisions entered in the two companion cases,
two dissenting opinions pointed out concerns in K.M. v. E.G..  Both dis-
sents disagreed with the majority’s choice to avoid treating the egg donor
the same way a sperm donor would be treated.89  This tension demonstrates
 80. Id.
 81. Id. at 677.
 82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004).
 83. K.M., 117 P.3d at 678.
 84. Id. at 678.
 85. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
 86. K.M., 117 P.3d at 679.
 87. Id. at 681.
 88. Id.
 89. Id. at 683-84 (Kennard, J., dissenting); id. at 688 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).  Justice Werdegar’s
dissent also points out concerns about the majority’s refusal to apply the intent test articulated in John-
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that the application of the UPA in its current form may lead to conflicting
decisions despite similar factual situations, reinforcing the concern raised
in Massachusetts that adjustments are necessary to address same-sex cou-
ples of either gender.
Finally, in Kristine H. v. Lisa R.,90 the parties, a committed same-sex
couple, obtained a court order prior to the baby’s birth, identifying one
partner as the biological parent and the other as the “second
mother/parent,” to allow both women to be identified as parents on the
child’s birth certificate.91  The order was granted under the provisions of
the UPA.92  When determining whether the birth-mother could challenge
the validity of the court’s judgment after the couple separated, the Supreme
Court of California did not address whether the judgment was appropriate
under the UPA, but held that the birth mother was estopped from chal-
lenging the judgment because she had “stipulated to the issuance of a
judgment, and enjoyed the benefits of that judgment for nearly two
years.”93
These three cases demonstrate the willingness and ability of a court to
use provisions of the UPA to determine parental rights and obligations of
same-sex partners without explicitly recognizing the validity of their rela-
tionship.  Rather than looking for ways to create a relationship that confers
some of the rights and responsibilities of parenthood upon the “legal
stranger” of a child, applying the provisions of the UPA to establish par-
enthood regardless of marital status will allow states to identify two par-
ents for each child whether they are being raised by a single parent, a het-
erosexual couple, or a same-sex couple.  However, there are still difficul-
ties arising from the application of the UPA to male relationships, espe-
cially because some states do not include provisions relating to assisted
reproductive techniques within the parentage legislative schemes.
B.  Vermont Declines to Apply Parentage Statute
The lack of uniformity in statutes related to parentage determinations
is evident in the alternative reasoning the Vermont Supreme Court used to
determine that partners in a same-sex civil union were both parents of a
child born during that civil union.94  In Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
son, which would allow it to evaluate preconception intent of the parties as well as concerns that the
majority opinion provides rights and responsibilities based on sexual orientation.  See id. at 687-88.
 90. 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
 91. Id. at 692.
 92. Id. at 695-96.
 93. Id. at 696.
 94. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶¶ 55-56.
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the Vermont Supreme Court declined to use the presumption of parent-
hood95 under its statutory scheme related to parentage to declare that both
women were entitled to parental status, reasoning that the presumption of
parentage was enacted to address child support issues rather than to deter-
mine legal parentage.96  Instead, the court found Janet had status as a par-
ent because she and Lisa were in a valid civil union at the time the child
was born; the couple intended that they would both be parents; Janet was
involved in the decision and procedures involving the conception and birth;
while living as a couple they had treated Janet as a parent and identified
her as such; and no one else claimed status as a parent.97  This reasoning
mirrors that used by California to determine that the California UPA con-
trolled the determination of parentage.
It is important to note that all of the cases that have addressed whether
the parental presumption applies to children of same-sex partners involved
relationships that had ended or were in the process of ending.98  Conse-
quently, in reaching its decision, the court has the ability to use hindsight
and to evaluate whether the party requesting parental rights has engaged in
appropriate behaviors to be considered a parent.  This hindsight is not
available to the courts when the same-sex couple is still together and is
trying to assert joint parenting rights in the face of challenges from others
rather than from each other.  This is likely to arise more frequently as cou-
ples in valid civil unions or same-sex marriages move to other locations.
V. ISSUES THAT ARISE WHEN SAME-SEX FAMILIES CROSS STATE
BORDERS
As long as same-sex couples remain in the states where their relation-
ship is acknowledged, their rights and responsibilities to their children re-
 95. Vermont’s presumption of parentage is codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2002) and
states:
 A person alleged to be a parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a
child if: (1) the alleged parent fails to submit without good cause to genetic testing as or-
dered; or (2) the alleged parents have voluntarily acknowledged parentage under the laws of
this state or any other state, by filling out and signing a Voluntary Acknowledgement of
Parentage form and filing the completed and witnessed form with the department of health;
or (3) the probability that the alleged parent is the biological parent exceeds 98 percent as
established by a scientifically reliable genetic test; or (4) the child is born while the husband
and wife are legally married to each other.
 96. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶ 44 (2006).
 97. Id. ¶ 56.
 98. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005) (child support dispute); K.M., 117
P.3d at 675 (custody and visitation dispute); Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 692 (motion to set aside stipulated
agreement regarding parental rights after parties separated); Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶ 1 (appeal of
custody and visitation orders).
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main generally intact.  However, as the Miller-Jenkins cases have demon-
strated, when a same-sex couple and their family relocate, or when part of
the family relocates, their entire legal relationship is put in jeopardy by
simply crossing state borders.
In almost all states that have banned same-sex marriage, or restricted
marriage to one man and one woman, the legislation doing so also specifi-
cally prohibits the recognition of such relationships that were created and
legalized in states where they are legal.
Heterosexual couples and their families do not face this challenge.
When a heterosexual couple relocates from Vermont, Massachusetts, or
Connecticut, to Florida, Utah, or any other state that bans same-sex mar-
riage, nothing about their legal relationship changes.  Yet, when a same-
sex couple and their children cross state borders, not only are they no
longer a legally recognized couple, but the parent-child relationship for at
least one of the parents may have effectively been terminated, with no
court action, no complaint, and no opportunity for the parent to object to
the termination.  In addition, there is no documentation of this legal “un-
doing” of the legal relationship.  The parental rights and responsibilities
simply do not transcend the state borders.  This change in the legal status
of one of the parents may prevent that parent from accessing school re-
cords, making medical decisions, and allowing children to inherit from the
parent.  In some states, unlike the children of heterosexual parents, the
children of same-sex parents may no longer be eligible for health insurance
coverage under the “other” parent’s health insurance, and may not be the
default beneficiaries of life insurance policies for that parent.
Depending on the original circumstances involved at the time of the
creation of the family, the intent of the couple when doing so may be com-
pletely thwarted.  In all instances, the gestational mother will be a parent.
Many times this will be part of the couple’s intention, at least when the
same-sex couple is female.  Applying the UPA, without modification, the
other partner will have no presumptive parenthood, so the child will either
have only one parent, because of an anonymous sperm donor, or an identi-
fied sperm donor who may never have intended to take a parental role, will
be the legal parent.  In some states that do not allow gestational surrogacy,
if the child were the product of donated gametes carried by a surrogate, the
gestational mother may even be identified as the parent even if she has
never seen the child since its birth.
The potential for issues such as this to arise as couples cross borders is
demonstrated in Finstuen v. Edmondson,99 which addressed an Oklahoma
statute that specifically prohibited the recognition of adoptions from other
 99. No. CIV-04-1152-C, 2006 WL 1445354 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2006).
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states if those adoptions involved more than one member of the same
sex.100  The court was reviewing a motion for summary judgment alleging
that the statute violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Right to Travel.101  Plaintiffs
were composed of three families.  One family had moved to Oklahoma
after both members of the same-sex couple had adopted their child in Cali-
fornia.102  Though California had included both women as adoptive par-
ents, Oklahoma refused to issue a birth certificate with both partners
named as parents.103  This couple had experienced difficulty in Oklahoma
when they were both attempting to be involved with their child’s medical
care.104  A second family was two women, one of whom had given birth
and the other of whom had adopted the child, while the birth mother’s pa-
rental rights were preserved.105  Though the adoption occurred in New Jer-
sey, the family relocated to Oklahoma.106  The couple alleged, and the
court agreed, that the legislation prohibiting Oklahoma from recognizing
the out-of-state same-sex parent adoption interfered with the adoptive par-
ent’s ability to sign school documents or medical documents on behalf of
her child.107  Finally, a third family consisted of a couple who had adopted,
in Washington, a child from Oklahoma prior to the addition of the restric-
tive language.108  After much legal wrangling, Oklahoma had issued a birth
certificate with both men’s names as parents, but the couple was afraid to
return to Oklahoma because they were concerned that their rights would
not be recognized in light of the amended legislation, which had been
changed to prohibit Oklahoma from recognizing an out-of-state adoption
by a member of a same-sex couple.109  The court found the first two cou-
ples had standing to challenge the statute because they could demonstrate
injury, but the couple who were already both recognized as parents on an
Oklahoma birth certificate did not have standing to challenge the legisla-
tion.110
 100. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (West Supp. 2006).  The statute requires recognition of
adoptions from other states as if Oklahoma had granted the adoption, “[e]xcept that, this state, any of
its agencies, or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption by more than one individual of
the same-sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.”
 101. Finstuen, 2006 WL 1445354, at *1.






 108. Id. at *1.
 109. Id.
 110. Id. at *5.
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Though the court struck down the statute as violating of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause,111  the Equal Protection Clause,112 and the Due Process
Clause,113 it found that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their right to
travel was infringed upon in any way because the only parties who were
restricted from traveling as a result of the potential enforcement of the stat-
ute were those living outside the state, but they had already been dismissed
for lack of standing.114
Though the Oklahoma statute is no longer in force, the fact that the
Oklahoma legislature felt compelled to enact such a statute demonstrates
that this issue may continue to arise.  DOMA gives states the right to limit
recognition of these otherwise-valid relationships, but it does not allow
states to alter parent-child relationships.  Consequently, states may feel
their ability to refuse recognition to same-sex couples is eroded if they
must grant them parental rights based on another state’s recognition of the
relationship.
This tension can be resolved by focusing on the parent-child relation-
ship rather than the couple’s relationship—but doing so means we will
need to strive for better consistency in statutes which determine parentage.
This consistency already exists in related areas, such as the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act115 and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act.116  Consistency is important when children are involved as
they innocently suffer the consequences of adults’ differences of opinion.
VI. POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
With many states enacting legislation prohibiting recognition of same-
sex relationships, and other states allowing the recognition of these rela-
tionships, it is clear that the legal status of those involved in these relation-
ships must be addressed.  States are making their wishes regarding the
couples well known, but these couples, recognized or not, often have legal
relationships with others—their children—based on the recognition or non-
 111. Id. at *7.
 112. Id. at *8.
 113. Id. at *14.
 114. Id. at *15.
 115. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997 & Supp. 2006).
The precursor to this act, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 261 (1968), was
adopted by all fifty states.  The revisions included in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforce-
ment Act have been adopted in forty-four states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Legislation is pending in four additional states.  National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws,  http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp (last visited
Nov. 1, 2006)
 116. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
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recognition of their relationships.  These children may suffer from the po-
tentially disastrous consequences of the decisions of state governments
about the status of their parents.
One way to minimize the potential harm to children of same-sex cou-
ples who relocate to states that do not recognize the couples’ relationship is
to focus on and protect the legal relationship between the parents and the
child, without requiring consideration of the same-sex relationship.  This
can be accomplished through the UPA, as shown by California.  However,
states that refuse to recognize the relationship of the parents are unlikely to
interpret the UPA to provide parental rights and responsibilities.  Never-
theless, a few adjustments to the UPA may make its application more pal-
atable.
Currently, if a state were to enact the UPA as written, in its entirety,
the only way to determine that a same-sex couple was composed of two
parents of a child would be to follow the lead of California in Elisa B.  and
K.M. and decide that the presumption of paternity can be used to determine
maternity as well and to ignore the use of husband and wife, treating both
categories as partners or spouses.  In addition, a court would have to
choose to avoid the application of the sperm donor language to an egg do-
nor, or to a sperm donor of a male same-sex couple who used a gestational
surrogate.  The likelihood of consistent results across different states would
be slim.  Instead, adjusting the UPA to address these situations would al-
low states to adopt a common language, with common meaning, leading to
a much higher probability of consistent decisions.  In addition, determining
parentage through legislation would eliminate the need for parentage de-
terminations to wait for a conflict that would allow the court to articulate
the rule.
The Uniform Parentage Act has had several different versions.  The
1973 UPA was adopted by nineteen states in its entirety, with several other
states choosing to enact portions.117  The 1973 version declared “all chil-
dren should be treated equally without regard to the marital status of par-
ents.”118  This goal is still relevant today.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws recog-
nized that courts did not always construe the 1973 version consistently, and
that there were several other uniform acts that addressed related areas such
as custody and surrogacy.119  The UPA was revised in 2000 and amended
in 2002, to become what is now the official recommendation of the Na-
 117. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 296 (2002).
 118. Id.
 119. Id.
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tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws.120  The goal of the
2000 UPA and the 2002 amendments was to treat children of unmarried
parents equally with children of married parents and to adapt to advances
in reproductive technologies.121  In addition, the new UPA added a Volun-
tary Acknowledgement of Paternity provision to comply with the federal
mandate that requires a simple non-judicial way to establish paternity for
newborns and young children.122
Justice Sosman of Massachusetts has suggested adjusting the parentage
legislation of Massachusetts.123  Other scholars have suggested that the
UPA already provides remedies for determining custody for same-sex par-
ents through the provisions in sections 106 and 201 allowing for a declara-
tion of maternity.124  However, while this may provide alternatives for fe-
male same-sex couples, these provisions provide no relief for male same-
sex couples.  By looking at the current remedies available, and making
some small changes, we can firmly establish a child’s parentage at the time
of the child’s birth, regardless of the situation of the child’s parents.
To adjust the UPA, the first step would be to replace “husband” and
“wife” with “parenting partner” or another gender-neutral term.  “Spouse”
would be effective for states that consider same-sex couples to be spouses,
but the majority of states do not do so.  Then, rather than focusing on “pa-
ternity,” the language of the statute would need to shift to focusing on the
more gender-neutral term of “parentage.”  The following sections will sug-
gest specific changes to each Article of the UPA.
A.  Article 1: General Provisions
Article 1 contains information identifying the title,125 defining terms,126
determining the scope and identifying the choice of law,127 naming the
 120. Id.
 121. Id.
 122. Id.  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) requires a state to develop “(i) . . . [p]rocedures for a simple civil
process for voluntarily acknowledging paternity . . . (ii) . . . includ[ing] a hospital-based program for
the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity focusing on the period immediately before or after the
birth of a child.”  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2006).  Paragraph (a)(5)(D)(ii) of this section requires that
the voluntary acknowledgement of paternity must be considered a “legal finding of paternity,” subject
to certain rights of rescission.  Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
 123. While recognizing the disparate results of the application of Massachusetts’ presumption of
paternity legislation to male same-sex couples and female same-sex couples, Justice Sosman suggests
that it might “make sense to rethink precisely how this biologically impossible presumption of paternity
ought to apply to same-sex couples, and perhaps make some modification that would clarify its opera-
tion in this novel context,” though no suggestions for modification are provided.  In re Opinions of the
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d at 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004).
 124. E.g., Jacobs, supra note 53, at 351.
 125. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 101, 9B U.L.A. 303 (2002).
 126. Id. § 102, 9B U.L.A. at 303-05.
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state with jurisdiction over proceedings involving the legislation,128 clari-
fying that provisions of other legislation related to privacy, medical re-
cords, and other related protections are still applicable,129 and explaining
that the current language related to paternity can also be used to determine
maternity.130
The title of the UPA appropriately focuses on parentage, rather than
limiting itself to paternity.  The Supreme Court has noted that there is a
difference between a declaration of fatherhood and a declaration of parent-
age, which brings with it “parental prerogatives.”131  These parental pre-
rogatives include those rights associated with raising a child,
including the child’s care; the right to the child’s services and
earnings; the right to make decisions regarding the control, educa-
tion, and health of the child; and the right, as well as the duty, to
prepare the child for additional obligations, which includes the
teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs, and the elements of
good citizenship.132
By focusing on parentage rather than paternity, the UPA should address the
determination of who is entitled to the parental prerogatives described by
the Court, regardless of whether they are male or female.
Section 102, which contains definitions, would require some small
adjustments.  Section 102(1) defines “acknowledged father” as a “man
who has established a father-child relationship under [Article] 3.”133  This
language could be expanded to include parents of either sex by substituting
“parent” for “father” and “person” for “man,” resulting in a definition of an
acknowledged parent as one who establishes a parent-child relationship by
voluntary acknowledgement.
“Presumed father” is defined in section 102(16).  This definition refers
to a man who is recognized as a father under the provisions related to the
presumption of parentage in section 204.  To allow the presumption of
parentage to apply equally to male parents and female parents, a situation
that currently exists through the application of section 106, the term to be
defined should be changed to “presumed parent” and “father” changed to
“parent.”
 127. Id. § 103, 9B U.L.A. at 306-07.
 128. Id. § 104, 9B U.L.A. at 307.
 129. Id. § 105, 9B U.L.A. at 308.
 130. Id. § 106, 9B U.L.A. at 308.
 131. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (plurality opinion).
 132. Id. at 118-19.
 133. The UPA includes brackets in several areas to indicate to prospective adopters language that can
be modified to fit the individual state’s statutory scheme.  Article 3 refers to the section that allows
parentage to be established by voluntary acknowledgement.
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Though adjusting the definitions to address parentage rather than pa-
ternity might eliminate the need for section 106, keeping this provision,
which allows the UPA to be applied to determine maternity in the same
manner in which paternity is determined, serves two purposes.  First, it
expresses the clear intent to allow the UPA to determine parentage of
mothers and fathers, and it allows the genetic testing provisions, which will
generally not be adjusted to accomplish the goal attempted here, to apply
to genetic mothers as well as fathers.
B.  Article 2: Parent-Child Relationship
Article 2 is the heart of the UPA, as it defines how the parent-child re-
lationship is established.  In its current form, the UPA identifies four ways
a mother-child relationship is established and six ways a father-child rela-
tionship is established.134  Though it is available through the application of
section 106, allowing maternity to be established in the same manner as
paternity, this provision does not specify that a mother-child relationship
can be established through the presumption found in section 204, although
this option is identified as a method of establishing paternity.  In addition,
paternity can be established through an acknowledgement of paternity,135
or consent to assisted reproduction under Article 7,136 though these options
are not identified as alternatives to establish maternity.
To allow parentage determinations to be applied to same-sex parents
the provisions available to men—the presumption of parentage, voluntary
acknowledgement, and consenting to the assisted reproduction of a woman
under Article 7, must also be available to women.  In addition, altering the
references to paternity to reflect parentage is necessary to focus on identi-
fying the legal parent, not just the legal father.
Section 203 seems to be a straightforward, innocuous provision.  It
states that “a parent-child relationship established under this [Act] applies
for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided by other law of
the State.”  The importance of this provision is evident by looking at the
Vermont Supreme Court’s analysis in Miller-Jenkins.  Since Vermont has
not adopted most of the UPA, this provision was not available to the court
and it chose to limit the application of the presumption of parentage to
cases involving the collection of child support, rather than using it to de-
termine that Janet was a parent of Lisa’s child.137  When adopting any revi-
sions of the UPA, states should include this provision to make it clear that
 134. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a), (b), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2002).
 135. Id. § 201(b)(2).
 136. Id. § 201(b)(5).
 137. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78 ¶ 44 (2006).
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the purpose of the UPA is determining parentage in all situations, rather
than only support or custody determinations.
The presumption of paternity is found in section 204.  The title of this
section should be adjusted to “Presumption of Parentage,” since that
change is already implied by section 106, and at least one state, California,
has interpreted this provision to apply to decisions about a woman’s par-
entage of another woman’s child.138  To reflect this change, as well as the
fact that a married couple in Massachusetts may be of the same-sex, the
term “man” would need to be changed to “person,” making it gender-
neutral; “father” would change to “parent”; and “paternity” would change
to “parentage.”  The result: a person is presumed to be a parent if married
to the mother, in all of the current variations, or for the first two years the
person held the child out as the person’s own while living in the same
household as the birth mother.  Though this does not yet provide for male
same-sex partners because of their unique need to use a gestational surro-
gate, it does allow both parents in the household to be female.
C.  Article 3: Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity
Article 3 of the UPA provides for the voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity through a civil process at the time of the child’s birth or shortly
thereafter.139  Included to address requirements of federal law,140 this sec-
tion requires genetic consanguinity in order to protect against parties
avoiding adoption regulations.141  As a result it cannot be used by male
same-sex couples.  However, by changing section 302 from referencing
“paternity” and “fathers” to addressing “parentage” and “person,” a woman
who donates her egg to a female partner would be able to acknowledge her
genetic parentage under this section.  Since the woman giving birth could
claim parentage under the presumption in section 201, both parents could
be determined at the time of the child’s birth.  This would be reinforced by
section 311, which requires a state that adopts this provision to give full
faith and credit to voluntary acknowledgements from other states, since,
under section 305, a valid acknowledgment is equivalent to a legal adjudi-
cation of parentage.  The remaining provisions would require small edito-
rial changes to reflect this substantive change, but would otherwise remain
intact.
 138. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005).
 139. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 304, 9B U.L.A. 315 (2002).
 140. Id. § 304 cmt.; see 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C).
 141. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 313 (2002).
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D.  Article 4: Registry of Paternity
Article 4 establishes a registry of paternity, to protect fathers’ rights in
cases of potential adoption.  This registry allows fathers to be notified if a
child that might be theirs is to be adopted.  Since there may be situations
where a same-sex parent would have a genetic relationship to a child who
might be put up for adoption, allowing this to be a “parentage registry”
rather than a “paternity registry” would cover the situation of a woman
who has a genetic relationship to a child that is carried by her partner or
former partner.
E.  Article 5: Genetic Testing
The provision of the UPA that addresses genetic testing, including
when such testing can be ordered, how it must be completed, and who will
bear the costs, need not be changed.  In order to require a party to submit to
genetic testing, the court must find that there is a reasonable probability of
sexual contact that would lead to conception.  Since this will never be the
case with same-sex partners, who will always need to use some form of
assisted reproduction, this provision will continue to apply to heterosexual
parents only.
F.  Article 6: Proceeding to Adjudicate Parentage
Article 6 addresses the details and requirements of proceedings to ad-
judicate parentage.  The requirements use terminology that results from
previous sections, such as “acknowledged father” and “presumed father.”
Without changing any of the details of the underlying proceedings, this
article can be edited to reflect the gender-neutral changes of the prior sec-
tions.  For instance, rather than granting standing to the child, mother, and
“man whose paternity is to be adjudicated,”142 standing could be granted to
the child, mother, and “person whose parentage is to be adjudicated.”  Ad-
ditional references to father and paternity could be changed to parent, or if
necessary to distinguish from the mother, second parent, and parentage.
Section 631 initially appears to present a stumbling block to the appli-
cation of this article to same-sex parents because it appears to require ge-
netic testing.143  However, should the court find that genetic testing does
not identify the father (or as suggested, parent), the court can then move on
 142. Id. § 602, 9B U.L.A. at 338-39.
 143. Id. § 631(1), 9B U.L.A. at 348.
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to adjudicate parentage using other evidence.144  Therefore, the provision
would allow proceedings to continue with same-sex parents with no ge-
netic relationship to the child.
G.  Article 7: Child of Assisted Reproduction
According to the latest statistical information from the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, in 2003, 35,785 births (delivery of one or
more infants) were the result of assisted reproductive techniques, resulting
in 48,756 children.145  Because of the variety of possible parentage deter-
minations that could arise when assisted reproductive techniques are used,
the UPA attempted to clarify the parentage of a child born as a result of
assisted reproduction.146  Since assisted reproduction is the only option
available to same-sex parents, this portion of the UPA must be considered
carefully.
Section 701 limits the application of Article 7 to situations that do not
involve sexual intercourse or gestational surrogacy.  Consequently, Article
7 will not apply to male same-sex couples, but will apply to females, since
one member of the female same-sex couple is likely to avail herself of as-
sisted reproductive techniques.
Sections 703 and 704 must be read in conjunction with each other, and
each needs adjusting to encompass children of same-sex couples.  Section
703 currently provides:  “A man who provides sperm for, or consents to,
assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in section 704 with the in-
tent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.”  The
comment following this section points to the increase in the use of assisted
reproductive techniques as a compelling reason to clarify the parentage of
children born in this manner.147  Section 704(a) requires: “Consent by a
woman, and a man who intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman
by assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by the woman and the
man.  This requirement does not apply to a donor.”  As a result of the ap-
plication of these two sections to a female same-sex couple, a woman who
provides her own egg to her partner for use in an assisted reproductive
technique is not considered a parent.  Throughout the UPA, a donor is a
person who provides an egg or sperm for use in assisted reproduction, but a
donor does not include a husband or wife who provides genetic materials
 144. Id. § 631(3), 9B U.L.A. at 349.
 145. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2003 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 13 (2005), available at  http://
 www.cdc.gov/art/art2003/PDF/ART03part1.pdf.
 146. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 354 (2002).
 147. Id. § 703 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 356.
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for the wife to use or the woman who gives birth to a child through assisted
reproduction unless doing so under a gestational surrogacy agreement.148
So, the woman providing her egg to her female partner is a donor, and
therefore is not a parent under section 703.  To remedy this situation, sec-
tion 703 should be amended to state: “A person who provides genetic ma-
terial for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in
section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the
resulting child.”  To maintain this change through section 704, sub-section
(a) should be changed to require consent by the woman and “the person”
intending to be the parent.  To further clarify the distinction between a do-
nor who has no parentage rights, and a woman who donates to her female
partner, revising the reference to donors in this section to read:  “This does
not apply to a donor unless the donor intends to raise the child in the cou-
ple’s joint home,” will allow a woman to donate her egg to another woman
who is not her same-sex partner in the traditional egg donation situation.
Further editorial changes to the provisions of Article 8 would be necessary
to provide gender-neutral terms such as “partner,” “cohabiting partner,”
and “couple,” rather than “wife” or “husband.”
H.  Article 8: Gestational Agreement
Article 8, covering gestational agreements, is an optional section of the
UPA.  Drafted in response to the fact that, despite widely varying state
laws about the legality of these agreements, thousands of children are born
through the use of gestational surrogates,149 the section attempts to deter-
mine the parentage of these children.  Whether legally approved or not,
gestational arrangements are currently the only option for male same-sex
couples to have a child genetically related to one of them.  Hence, states
would be well-advised to include this provision to address the results of the
reality of today’s reproductive world.  As noted in the comments associ-
ated with Article 8, courts have realized that they will be forced to address
these issues regardless of whether the procedures are banned or criminal-
ized, and the children born as a result cannot be ignored.150
To expand the coverage of Article 8 to address parentage decisions in-
volving same-sex couples, only one section needs to be changed, and,
though powerful, the changes are slight.  Section 801 authorizes the use of
gestational agreements provided certain conditions are met. Section
801(a)(2) requires “the prospective gestational mother, her husband if she
 148. Id. § 102(8), 9B U.L.A. at 304.
 149. Id. art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 360-62.
 150. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
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is married, and the donors relinquish all rights and duties as the parents of
a child conceived through assisted reproduction”; thereby eliminating any
possibility that the sperm donor151 is a parent of the resulting child.
Though the application of the revised definition of “donor” would likely
allow a member of a male same-sex couple to be an intended parent, the
fact that this provision is the only one that allows members of a male cou-
ple to become parents warrants reinforcing that possibility here.  Hence,
adding a limitation to donors to specifically except those who are the in-
tended parent would clarify the potential application of the section to in-
tended fathers who donate sperm to a gestational mother.  Finally, in sec-
tion 801(b), substituting “individuals” for “man and woman” allows the
provision to be gender-neutral.
The remaining provisions of this section are drafted in gender-neutral
terms and, though they require the interference of a court to judicially ap-
prove the agreement, would allow a male same-sex couple to be legally
recognized as the parents of a child, regardless of the genetic relationship
or lack thereof.
I.  Article 9: Miscellaneous Provisions
The final section of the UPA provides typical legislative details re-
garding severability,152 effective date,153 repeal of prior conflicting legisla-
tion,154 and transition issues.155  Most importantly, it also provides a section
requiring states to interpret the provisions of the UPA in ways that main-
tain consistency between the various states that enact it.156  In order to pro-
vide stability for children who become the innocent victims of disagree-
ments between states regarding the status of their parents, this section is
essential.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether we believe same-sex couples should be allowed to get mar-
ried, enter into civil unions, or raise children, the reality is that they do so.
Over time, whether or how we recognize the relationship between the
adults will become clear.  In the meantime, the legal relationship between
 151. “Donor” is defined in section 102(8) and specifically excludes an intended parent under a gesta-
tional agreement.
 152. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 902, 9B U.L.A. 371.
 153. Id. § 903, 9B U.L.A. at 371.
 154. Id. § 904, 9B U.L.A. at 371-72.
 155. Id. § 905, 9B U.L.A. at 372.
 156. Id. § 901, 9B U.L.A. at 371.
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members of a same-sex couple and their children must be clarified to avoid
treating children differently based on their parents’ marital status.  Being
proactive about the status of these parent-child relationships will allow for
greater consistency among states and will avoid the long, drawn out legal
battles that harm the parent-child relationship and create potential conflicts
between states that are epitomized in the Miller-Jenkins case that, after
three years, still has not been completely resolved.
